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T H E  S T A T E  A N D  T H E  E C O N O M Y  IN 
L A T E  I M P E R I A L  C H I N A  
ALBERT FEUERWERKER 
The question, theoretical and empirical, of the relation of the state to the 
economy in preindustrial societies has of course not been ignored. Marx, for 
example, made this one of his central concerns in those sections of the 
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie that discuss precapitalist 
economic formations. And nearly all research on China's economic and 
social history has, explicitly or implicitly, taken account of the imperial 
government as a positive, or a negative, or a neutral factor in the develop- 
ment of the specific historical problem under study. What 1 propose to do in 
this brief paper is to consider a number of the ways in which the state in the 
Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties (i.e., from the eleventh through the nine- 
teenth centuries, which we may call "late imperial China "l ) did in fact 
interact with the economy; to discuss these policies and measures in the 
context of the potential means by which a premodern state may influence a 
premodern economy; and at times to compare the Chinese historical expe- 
rience with that of early modern Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries. 
I am concerned with such questions as the extent to which Chinese adminis- 
trators in the late imperial period deliberately intervened in the economy, 
how they" did so, and with what results. What impact did their unwitting 
intervention (e.g., through the collection of taxes) have? Can the remarkable 
premodern economic growth that China experienced be attributed to the 
character or intensity of state intervention? How did the Chinese experience 
in these regards differ from that of early modern Europe, and to what degree 
does state intervention account for the more rapid growth of the European 
economy after 1750? So broad an essay as this one can, I fear, only 
demonstrate my own historical ignorance. But it may nevertheless be useful 
in identifying some particularly salient problems that merit further investi- 
gation. 
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. 
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This large subject cannot be covered systematically in so brief a space. Before 
proceeding with my partial effort, let me indicate the broader range of 
distinctions that a more thorough presentation might require, and thus 
locate this paper more precisely. In the case of the "state," for example, we 
ought to distinguish at least between the court or dynasty on the one hand 
and the imperial bureaucracy on the other, as well as between central and 
local government. In considering the policies or actions of the state that can 
affect the economy, it is useful to distinguish those that require direct fiscal 
expenditures by the state (and thus control of some part of the output of the 
economy) from those that do not entail a direct expenditure of economic 
resources (although they call for other kinds of "expenditures," say of 
political power or prestige). The various measures undertaken by the gov- 
ernment may primarily affect either the supply side of the economy (i.e., the 
structure and size of the production and distribution of commodities and 
services), or the demand side (i.e., the structure and size of the consumption 
of commodities and services). Their consequences may be measured, in other 
words, by changes in the values of a large variety of different indicators: for 
example, size of total output; size of output per capita; composition of 
output; relative importance of the sectors of the economy; levels of technol- 
ogy; price and wage levels; the ratio of consumption, savings, and invest- 
ment; and the level of imports and exports. 
Unfortunately, reliable and systematic statistical data for such measure- 
ments are rare in any premodern society, China included. We have certainly 
not yet compiled and analyzed all of the quantifiable information that can be 
derived from the public and private documents of premodern China. But 
even with the best of outcomes, I expect that for many critical measurements 
we shall always have to rely in some degree on indirect or partial evidence. 
Limited Direct Government Influence on the Economy 
State policies or actions with respect to the economy that required direct 
expenditures were limited by the amounts of money, goods and labor that 
the government controlled through direct and indirect taxation, corv~e 
services, and other government income. Is it possible even to guess what 
proportion of national income in the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties was 
controlled by the state and thus provided a potential means for influencing 
the economy directly? While there are abundant data about tax quotas and 
even some reporting of actual tax collections and receipts, the money value 
of corv~e services prior to their gradual incorporation into the land tax in the 
late Ming and early Qing is probably impossible to estimate with any 
certainty. And estimates of national income (itself a concept with a variety of 
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meanings in practice) can only be very rough. We shall need to begin with 
what I believe are a number of reasonable assumptions: (1) nonagricultural 
employment in China from the ninth century through the eighteenth was 
about 20 percent of total employment; (2) the value added per capita by 
nonagricultural labor (even in premodern handicraft industry) was greater 
than in farming, so that perhaps only 70 percent of national income originat- 
ed in the agricultural sector; (3) 80 percent of cultivated acreage was planted 
in grain so that, assuming a constant return per acre, grain output was 
typically about 60 percent of national income (0.8 • 0.7 = 0.56); and (4) the 
output of grain per capita remained relatively constant at 500 600 catties 
(250-300 kg) of unhusked grain (paddy, gu). 1 have combined these assump- 
tions with estimates of population size, normal grain prices, and typical 
annual government revenue to conjure into existence Table I. 
I am very unsure of the Song figures especially: was it really the case, as they 
seem to imply, that the government in the Northern Song period had 
potentially greater ability to affect the economy directly than its successors? 
In a broad sense, such a conclusion would fit Robert M. Hartwell's 
hypothesis, based on a close study of the financial bureaucracy, that the 
notable economic expansion in the Northern Song was in part the result of 
policies adopted by experienced, technically competent fiscal officials with a 
national rather than a local outlook. 2 These measures (for example, the 
encouragement of foreign trade, and an increased supply of money) tended 
to expand markets and to reduce the risk level of commerce. What this guess 
about the overall tax revenue as a proportion of national income does 
suggest, if we use five to seven percent as a typical figure, is that in this respect 
pre-twentieth century China was comparable to preindustrial Europe. Even 
in the mid-nineteenth century, public expenditure in most European states 
was still only 4-6 percent of national income. (In the twentieth century, of 
course, this proportion grew significantly to 20 percent and more.) 
This comparison is somewhat misleading in that the public sector in Song, 
Ming, and Qing China was continuously able to levy general direct taxation, 
i.e., the land tax, while even at the end of the Middle Ages in Europe, direct 
taxes were still occasional imposts that were overshadowed in importance 
by indirect charges (customs duties, tolls, excises, etc.). When general direct 
taxation reappeared in Europe in the early modern period, it was the 
occasion for the convening of representative assemblies of property owners 
to give their consent to these levies. The dimensions of public income in 
Europe thus caught up with those bf imperial China during the process of 
state-building in an age of absolute monarchy, in which both military costs 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estates to the national level. But there does seem to have been a "natural" 
limit to the relative size of government consumption prior to the very recent 
past, which was shared by both China and Europe. 
In part, this difference between the limited capacity of the state to affect the 
economy directly in the era of traditional or premodern economic growth 
and its enhanced capacity in the period of modern economic growth is a 
result of the absence even of the concept of sustained economic development 
per capita in the first case. To a remarkable degree, premodern societies have 
shared a primary concern with the question of how a relatively constant 
economic product should be distributed (usually in the interest of social 
order and the retention of power by the ruler). In circumstances where 
growth of output per capita was in fact uncommon, this restricted sense of 
what the state should undertake is understandable. It was reinforced by the 
real limitations that premodern technology (in transportation and commun- 
ications, for example) set on the government's span of control, or what it 
could accomplish by administrative measures. 
1 wonder if that traditional span of control may not be in some way related to 
the degree of urbanization in premodern societies, that is, to the percentage 
of the population concentrated in substantial cities, where the state may 
exercise more direct control than it can wield over a population scattered in 
rural areas. In China, the city was the natural locus of the imperial bureau- 
crat, while in early modern Europe the cities, which had developed within a 
feudalized rural society at a time when the state practically did not exist, 
joined with the absolute monarchs to undo the rural lords. To be sure, there 
were possibly significant differences between China's pre-twentieth century 
cities and those of Europe prior to the industrial revolution (a matter that I 
cannot consider here). But is it too wild to speculate that Ming and Qing 
China were about as urbanized as early modern Europe; that China in the 
Song dynasty was perhaps even more so; and that the urbanization ratio and 
thus the direct economic leverage of the premodern state in both China and 
Europe were limited by similar constraints? 
By 1600, out of 75 million Europeans, 3.5 million or somewhat less than 5 
percent of the total lived in perhaps one hundred sizeable cities. Twenty 
percent of the population were located in small rural towns, and more than 70 
percent lived in the countryside. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
saw the continued expansion of the urban population of Europe, and the 
nineteenth century of course was an era of intense urban growth. In 1800, 
there were twenty-three cities with populations in excess of 100,000, contain- 
ing a total of 5.5 million persons or 3 percent of Europe's 192 million people. 
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By 1900, out of a total population of 432 million, 46 million or 10 percent 
lived in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
Although his numbers are not strictly speaking comparable to the European 
estimates just cited, G. William Skinner's pioneering systematic effort to 
measure the extent of urbanization in the late Qing proposes that in 1893 
there were 877 urban central places with 4,000 or more inhabitants whose 
combined population was 20.8 million or 5.3 percent of China's total. Alterna- 
tive definitions of "urban" would increase the number of central places to 
3,445, and the urban population to 25.7 million or 6.5 percent of the total. 
Skinner concludes that 23.5 million persons, an urbanization rate of 6 
percent, is a usable estimate for 1893. His less reliable estimate for 1843 is 
20.7 million urban residents and an urbanization rate of 5. i percent. And he 
suggests, furthermore, that in both north China and Jiangnan, 3 a higher 
percentage of the population lived in cities in the Song period than in the 
Qing, while the largest cities of the Tang and Song dynasties were of greater 
size than their Ming and Qing counterparts. 4 
The limits to urbanization - and, 1 am arguing, also to direct government 
intervention in the economy - in the preindustrial world were set by the 
availability of food supplies, the transport costs of bringing that food to 
cities, and by urban demographic patterns of probably higher mortality but 
lower fertility than in rural areas. Not everyone even in rural China was 
exclusively engaged in raising food. If we allow our earlier assumption of 20 
percent of the total as the proportion of nonagricultural employment from 
the tenth century through the eighteenth, then at the least the agricultural 
labor force (80 percent of total employment) annually produced a surplus of 
20 percent above what was required by minimum and customary consump- 
tion standards in order to maintain itself. Since, even with Engel's law, 5 the 
wealthy among the nonagricultural population consumed more than the 
average amount of food, it is likely that the annual surplus was as high as 25 
percent. This was the theoretical upper limit on the size of the nonagricultu- 
ral population including those who lived in cities. In the real world, 
however, total agricultural yield can easily fluctuate 25 percent or more from 
year to year due to natural (temperature, floods, droughts, insects, etc.) or 
man-made (war, political instability, foolish agricultural policies, etc.) disas- 
ters. Prior to the modern agricultural revolution, periodic subsistence crises 
were clearly inevitable, and set strict limits to the proportion of the popula- 
tion who could live and work in cities and towns, which had to be fed from 
the countryside. 
With the severe limitations of premodern transportation I cannot deal here, 
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except to note that in north China, at least, this was a factor limiting the 
number and size of cities until the advent of the railroad in the late nineteenth 
century. In circumstances of large annual harvest fluctuations, high trans- 
port costs, sometimes questionable reliability of the market as a secure 
source of supply (for example, due to popular opposition of shipments of 
food from grain surplus to grain deficit areas when prices were high), and 
inelastic demand (because income levels were generally low), the supply and 
maintenance of food stocks was an important constraint on the size and 
stability of urban places. 
But food stocks are capital, indeed an important component (together with 
stocks of raw materials and of finished goods) of the total working capital of 
a preindustrial economy. And working capital prior to the industrial revolu- 
tion represented a much larger proportion of total capital than the fixed 
capital invested in buildings, machinery, boats, carts, etc. The cost of creat- 
ing and maintaining these food stocks (working capital) included warehous- 
ing, deterioration during storage, the implied interest paid if the stocks were 
built with borrowed funds, and the opportunity cost (of other investments 
foregone) if they were built with one's own means. The"ever-normal granar- 
ies" (changping cang) of imperial China, whose stocks in the eighteenth 
century were frequently built by the diversion of government tribute grains, 
may sometimes have been sufficient to cope with annual harvest shortfalls, 
but their total stocks were inadequate to smooth out large cyclical price 
fluctuations. One recent estimate of the adequacy of the combined stocks of 
the changping cang and the community granaries (she cang) of Sichuan in 
the early nineteenth century concludes that they held only a twenty-three-day 
supply for the adult population. 6 Frederick the Great of Prussia was able to 
maintain government stocks of grain equivalent to eighteen months' con- 
sumption scattered around the country; eighteenth-century France, in con- 
trast, was unable to control wide and continuing fluctuations of grain prices 
in the last decades ofancien rkgime, and suffered widespread peasant revolts 
that prefigured the great risings of 1789. In sum, maintaining the government 
granaries was expensive, and this too set a limit on the urbanization ratio. 
Wang Anshi's "green shoots law" (qingmiaofa) was severely attacked by his 
opponents on the grounds that farmers had to pay exorbitant interest rates 
for these short-term loans from the government granaries. 7 But the real costs 
(namely the market interest on the borrowed grain) were unavoidably high in 
circumstances of high market interest rates and capital shortages. 
There was an additional large externality cost to maintaining substantial 
food stocks - in Europe at least. The matter of plague and typhus epidemics 
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in urban areas spread by a large rodent population which fed on the stored 
food has not, so far as I am aware, been fully studied in the case of China. 
The probability that epidemic disease was more destructive in urban condi- 
tions of crowding and poor sanitation than in rural areas is a major reason 
for believing that urban mortality rates were higher than rural ones. And the 
age-sex ratios of urban migrants (probably an excess of young, unmarried 
males) similarly suggests a lower overall urban fertility rate. It is thus possible 
that preindustrial cities in China and in Europe had a negative demographic 
balance even in normal times, and survived only through a continued flow of 
population from the countryside. This in itself set a limit to the degree of 
urbanization in premodern societies prior to some striking increase in the per 
capita productivity of agricultural labor. And so the effective span of state 
control or influence over the economy was also constrained. From a macro- 
economic point of view, premodern economies, if not models of laissezfaire 
or neo-classical economics' free movement of factors, were nevertheless only 
minimally accessible to control and direction by central government admin- 
istrators. 
Varieties of  Indirect Influence 
If the ability of the Chinese state to influence the economy directly through 
government revenues and expenditures was about the same from the Song 
through the Qing periods as that of early modern European states, it does not 
necessarily follow that their indirect capacities were the same. We need to 
look at the politics of the Chinese imperial government and how these 
indirectly affected the economy. If the concept of"feudal autocracy" (feng- 
jian zhuanzhi), so current as an explanation in China today for that country's 
failure to develop its own "capitalism," is at all useful in understanding the 
problems of China's premodern economic history, it would seem to be in this 
connection that it should be considered. First, however, we should under- 
stand that the ways in which both direct and indirect measures were actually 
employed reflected the fact that from the Song onward, China's economy 
was essentially a market economy in which most of the economic results were 
determined by decisions made and actions taken in the private sector. 
Pockets of public ownership and activity remained in the economy and 
fluctuated in importance. But from the breakdown after the mid-eighth 
century of the Tang efforts to control the ownership of land - the primary 
means of production - by administrative measures and to subject marketing 
to strict regulation, there was a clear tendency for public and private to be 
more clearly differentiated and for the private sector to be enlarged at the 
expense of the public. 
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The public land of the military agricultural colonies (tuntian) established in 
the early Ming was largely absorbed into the system of private land owner- 
ship by the sixteenth century, either through leases tO civilian farmers or the 
transformation of military families into full-time farmers with permanent 
ownership rights in the land. Precisely the same process even more quickly 
undermined the Qing attempt to establish a Manchu type of landholding 
system in north China on lands mainly confiscated from the Ming imperial 
family and nobility. This banner land (qidi) was sold or leased to private Han 
Chinese farmers because it could produce a higher revenue in this manner 
than by being cultivated as "feudal" estates. The state's near monopoly of 
overseas shipping and trade at the beginning of the Ming gave way after the 
fifteenth century to a nominally illegal and largely private commerce with 
Southeast Asia and Japan. For strategic reasons, however, the Ming gov- 
ernment's role in the horse trade with Manchuria and Mongolia remained 
significant. Even in the silk and porcelain industries, in which the Imperial 
Silkworks at Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Nanjing, and the Imperial Pottery at 
Jingdezhen figured so prominently, the great majority of the manufacturing 
establishments and trading firms were privately owned. 
Cotton culture and manufacture, the most widespread handicraft industry in 
the Ming and Qing periods, was entirely a private enterprise. Cotton growing 
in Jiangnan and north China, spinning and weaving by peasant households, 
fulling, calendering and dyeing of the cloth in workshops located in market 
towns, the distribution of yarn and cloth by itinerant merchants, and its 
physical transportation by cart, boat, or human carrier at each stage, the 
fixed and working capital were entirely private, and the relations between 
producers, merchants, and purchasers were established in the market. While 
the Shanxi banks (piaozhuang) 8 that grew in importance in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries developed ties with government departments and 
individual officials and handled some of their financial affairs, they were 
nevertheless basically privately financed and managed. And the old-style 
banks (qianzhuang) 9 were even more clearly and completely in the private 
sector. Although they were subject to the regulation of salt officials, the salt 
workers and merchants, and their manufacturing and commercial proper- 
ties, retained a private or semi-private status. 
At times it appears that, rather than having burdened the private economy 
excessively with multitudinous taxes, the government's revenues were inade- 
quate even for the critical expenses associated with its own maintenance 
against external military threats or internal popular uprisings. The Northern 
Song(960-1126), for example, in spite of the growth of its revenues, seems to 
have experienced difficulties in raising the expenses of wars against the Xixia 
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and Jin; likewise for the Southern Song (1127-1279) in face of the Mongol 
military threat. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Ming faced unanticipated 
military costs largely because of the decay of the weisuo garrison system, I~ 
which the founders of the dynasty had expected would be self-sustaining. 
Militia expenses to counter the incursions of the so-called "Japanese pirates" 
(wokou)  II in the south required at least two to three million taels (ounces of 
silver, the basic unit of a'ccount) annually in addition to seven to eight million 
taels for frontier defenses. The growing threat of the Manchus on the 
northern frontier, together with spreading peasant uprisings in the early 
decades of the seventeenth century, greatly strained the cumbersome and 
inflexible Ming tax system. Even with the land tax increases, which came in 
1618 and after, the M ing financial problem was less one of an unbearable tax 
burden than that the tax structure and administration could not raise enough 
revenue to meet critical expenses and collected what it did with a good deal of 
inefficiency and inequity. 
The land tax system copied by the Qing from the Ming with some modifica- 
tions apparently produced adequate revenue in terms of the state's goals 
through the eighteenth century. But it was completely unable to respond 
quickly and sufficiently to the new demands for financial resources arising 
from the confrontation with the Western powers in the nineteenth century. 
In fact, the real burden of the Qing land tax declined steadily during the 
eighteenth century as the market price of rice rose while both the proportion 
of commuted payment in silver (the commutation rate) and the commuta- 
tion price remained constant. Wang Yeh-chien has very ingeniously pro- 
duced the best estimates that we now have of the size of the Qing land tax 
revenue in 1753 and 1908, and its share in total government revenue. In 
Table II, Wang's data are displayed together with calculations that I have 
made of the per capita burden of each tax item. These use a population 
estimate of 225 million for the mid-eighteenth century and 420 million for the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and conservatively assume a price rise of 
100 percent between the two dates (150 percent might be closer to the truth). 
While prices increased in the eighteenth century, they declined in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century (which probably has something to do with 
popular uprisings in mid-century), and only rose again in the last decades of 
the Qing dynasty. The estimates are rough, but they strongly suggest that the 
real burden of Qing taxes (which is the same thing as the real resources made 
available to the state) was at the mercy of unforeseeable price changes. 
Measured in real per capita terms, the total Qing tax burden was unchanged 
between 1753 and 1908; the land tax burden fell by half; the burden of the salt 
tax increased by perhaps 40 percent; and miscellaneous taxes became three 















































































































































































































































































































































































The consequences of a light fiscal hand, which in turn was partly due to an 
inflexible tax system, were thus not always desirable ones for the state or for 
the economy. But the pervasive support for light taxation in traditional 
China, which based itself on aspects of the dominant Neo-Confucian ideol- 
ogy, must itself not be taken lightly, especially as it was closely linked to the 
central social question of the incidence of taxation, and to the politics of the 
Chinese state. 
The hierarchies of wealth, political power, and social status in China from 
the Song onward were dominated by elite lineages of which most of the 
constituent families were landlords of greater or lesser wealth. Many of the 
sons of these families aspired to success in the civil service examination 
system and thus by education shared the values of the much smaller number 
of their relatives and peers who did obtain higher degrees and go on to 
official careers in the imperial bureaucracy. We may thus schematically 
divide the dominant elite into (1) those who held office, had once held office, 
or expected to hold office (the bureaucratic elite); and (2) their much more 
numerous relatives and peers who might have a traditional education but 
lacked the formal qualifications - usuallyfinshi orjuren degree status - for 
substantial office (the nonbureaucratic or local elite.) 12 Although they came 
from similar social backgrounds, the bureaucratic elite and local elite (the 
latter are frequently called "gentry" by English-language writers) could and 
did differ in the degree to which they had a commitment to the state or 
government itself as opposed to sustaining gentry wealth, power and status 
in local society. This "ruling class," so to speak, shared the common necessity 
to control sufficient amounts of the surplus produced by the agricultural 
labor force to permit it as a group (although the fate of individual families 
might be more precarious) to continue to dominate. But the national outlook 
of the bureaucratic elite (what I have called elsewhere "Confucian raison 
d'~tat") could differ from the parochialism of the local gentry (what I have 
called "Confucian general will") with respect to such important matters as 
taxation and government economic policies) 3 
These contradictory tendencies were evident in the Song period in several 
different contexts. | have already noted Professor Hartwell's study of the 
Northern Song fiscal officials, the greater number of whom he finds to have 
come from high status lineages with a national orientation. By the twelfth 
century, however, the power of this group had been-undermined by faction- 
alism. Its successors were fiscal officials who, on the whole, were more 
limited in their outlook - i.e., more representative of the local gentry - and 
whose economic policies led to a contraction of the economic growth so 
apparent in the earlier Northern Song. Another Song example: Wang An- 
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shi's "new policies, ''14 although they did not derive from some populist 
ideology, in practice favored small landlords and independent owner-culti- 
vators more than the owners of the larger estates (zhuangyuan), which grew 
up in the late Tang and Song. The reformers' efforts to cope with the serious 
problem of short-term agricultural finance, to commute corvbe obligations 
into money payments (which were in part based on total wealth - i.e., 
landholdings as well as the number of adult males per household), to 
stabilize supplies and prices by government purchases and sales, etc., clearly 
served to reduce economic risks in a largely market-oriented economy in the 
interest primarily of enhancing national strength. They were opposed by the 
"conservatives," led by S ima Guang ( 1019 1086), both because ideologically 
they seemed to represent an excessively "Legalist" approach to government 
and because they involved some costs to the wealthier landlords. 
And as a third Song example of how the relative strength of bureaucratic as 
opposed to nonbureaucratic elite interests could indirectly affect the struc- 
ture and development of the economy, compare, on the one hand, the growth 
of sizeable landed estates, which I have noted above and, on the other hand, 
the very clear tendency documented by Brian E. McKnight for privileged 
exemptions from the land tax and from"administrative labor service" (zh(vi) 
to be greatly reduced during the Song period. 15 This process, McKnight 
points out, was reversed in the Yuan and Ming dynasties. The zhuangyuan 
were probably not so dominant as Sudo Yoshiyuki and the Tokyo University 
"school" of Song studies 16 have suggested; they were not farmed as integral 
units, but rather rented out in quite small plots; and their tenants were not 
normally unfree laborers. They did, however, represent concentrations of 
local wealth, which were not appreciably reduced by Wang Anshi'sfangtian 
junshuifa, 17 or similar reform measures in the Southern Song. But the estates 
were apparently generally liable to taxation proportionate to their size, as 
their owners were subject to zhiyi. The situation is complicated by the 
warrantable suspicion that some wealthy households were able to manipu- 
late this type of service for their own benefit. But overall, these three 
examples suggest how the relative political strength of sections of the elite 
with somewhat different primary orientations shaped the capacity and 
manner of indirect state influence upon what was already basically a market 
economy. 
It was certainly consequential that the early Ming largely bequeathed the 
empty lands in north China resulting from the fierce wars at the end of the 
Yuan dynasty as estates to the politically privileged, relatives and supporters 
of the first emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1368-1398). The early Qing, in 
contrast, opened up devastated Sichuan, the Han river highlands, and other 
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areas that had been depopulated during the wars of the Ming-Qing transition 
almost entirely for resettlement by small peasant households. The state, in 
other words, could be important in defining property rights and thus shaping 
the economy. But at the same time, Zhu Yuanzhang was not happy with the 
elite property owners of 3iangnan, who had supported a rival claimant to 
power, and therefore confiscated many of the estates in that area and moved 
their proprietors to his new capital at Nanjing. 
The Ming lijia obligations (services connected with tax collection), however, 
worked out so disastrously for the small farmers to whom the 3iangnan 
estates had been allocated (in fact as state tenants on government land, but de 
jure as owner-cultivators participating in the lifia rotation) that, by various 
subterfuges, the S ong situation of large private estates farmed by tenants had 
been restored by the late fifteenth century. Lifia and other Ming service 
obligations were somewhat progressive in their incidence in that not only the 
number of adult males but also household wealth were considered in assign- 
ing families to the various tax categories. In practice, local landlords not 
holding examination degrees that would have exempted them from tifia and 
other corvee might sometimes be subject to very heavy burdens arising in 
part out of the cumbersomeness and inefficiency of the obsolescent Ming tax 
system, which had not changed with the changing economy. Many sought to 
evade taxes altogether by falsifying local records, bribing sub-officials, etc. 
There was thus an incentive for the elite as a whole - but especially for the 
bureaucratic elite - to exchange some part of their formal exemptions from 
service obligations in return for a more regularized tax system in which the 
burden would be more predictable and hence more suitable for the growing 
commercial character of the sixteenth-century economy. The "single whip" 
(yitiao bian) reform, TM a quite complicated process, which involved a good 
deal more than I have had space to point out here, came too late however. In 
any case, it had been pursued in the interest of elite commoners - the local 
gentry - and not of the tenants and landless laborers. And gentry privilege 
itself was severely shaken by the massive peasant uprisings of the seventeenth 
century, and then by the Manchu conquest. 
What I have meant to point out again, in these Ming examples of changing 
property rights and tax burdens, was the existence of a range of indirect state 
influence on the economy along a spectrum that we can label Confucian 
raison d'~tat at one end (the interest of the state and its officials) and 
Confucian general will at the other (the interest of the local elite). Of course, 
in the middle ranges, the two blended into one another. 
There seems also to have been a very rough alternation in the salience of these 
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two orientations. If gentry interests pushed too far created the opportunity 
for the Manchu conquest, the early Qing dynasty combined the stick with the 
carrot to cope with gentry tax evasions. The 1661 "Jiangnan Tax Case" cost 
thousands of wealthy gentry households accused of tax irregularities their 
examination degrees, ranks, posts, and property. But the Kangxi emperor (r. 
1661-1722) relented some was it that he had imbibed more deeply than his 
predecessors in Confucian culture, including its "general will" tendencies? 
I mperial tax remissions in the period 1662 1711 probably exceeded 100 mil- 
lion taels; fixing the ding ("commuted labor service") quota permanently at 
the level of the 1711 ding returns was certainly meant to exhibit the emperor's 
grace. But the Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723-1735) in turn was opposed to his 
father's leniency about local tax arrearages. Yongzheng acted to recover 
central government control of the land tax surcharges (in particular of the 
huohao or haoxian, "meltage fee"). On the one hand, he formally sanctioned 
these levies for the purpose of providing increased salaries (yanglian yin, 
"money to nourish integrity") to imperial officials; and on the other hand, he 
required that they be delivered to provincial treasuries for allocation, rather 
than being retained at the county level where they had provided personal 
income for the gentry and less scrupulous local officials. In implementing this 
policy, Yongzheng received his most important support from the Han 
bannerman Tian Wenjing (1662-1732), a strategically placed provincial 
official. 
All of this suggests that, in addition to the interest of the state versus the 
excesses of the local gentry, we have an excellent example in this case of the 
distinct political interest of the emperor and dynasty as an additional element 
in the politics of indirect government influence on the economy. The emper- 
or's role vis-a-vis the economy need not be, though it frequently was, limited 
to enjoying the resources made available to the court by the neiwufu (Impe- 
rial Household Office) and similar agencies in other dynasties. Note also that 
by incorporating the ding entirely into the land tax, Yongzheng removed the 
last remaining formal gentry exemptions from tax obligations. 
Of course it didn't last. Other surcharges escaped imperial control. The 
gentry, by employing the influence of their fellows in high office, successfully 
resisted all efforts to achieve accurate registration of their landholdings. And 
Yongzheng in 1727, probably for the first time in Chinese history, made 
tenant refusal to pay land rents a punishable crime. 
I cannot here continue with the nineteenth-century situation where it might 
be argued again that the yangwupai, and even more the reformers of 1898,19 
were advocates of economic policies and projects increasingly nationalistic in 
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character and not always in the specific interest of the more conservative 
elements of the local gentry. The politics of the imperial state with respect to 
the economy, while they could never be such as would consciously under- 
mine the society in which they operated, were at the same time not a simple 
monolithic absolutism that obstructed the growth of output. Indeed, it is 
evident that the combined direct and indirect influence of the state on the 
economy may not have been either large enough or of the right kind to 
promote "modern economic growth" in the changed world conditions of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But if the sustained growth of output per 
capita on the basis of continuous scientific and technical innovation (i.e., 
modern economic growth) was not achieved in imperial China, this was not 
primarily because the state always suppressed or relentlessly exploited proto- 
capitalist elements. And the actions of the state certainly did not bar "pre- 
modern economic growth" - i.e., the expansion of total output and total 
population with no per capita increases, the production and distribution of 
more of the agricultural and handicraft products of essentially the same 
technology. 
The failure to distinguish between the two partially discrete processes of 
modern and premodern economic growth may mislead us both with respect 
to the questions we ask about the relation of the state to the economy and 
with respect to the evidence we might seek in support of our answers. 
Premodern growth has occurred within a traditional technology that at best 
changed only very slowly and whose limits were at any time constantly being 
approached. The historical experience and institutional arrangements that 
might predispose to premodern growth may substantially impede later eco- 
nomic development of a different kind. And conversely, the scientific-tech- 
nological and organizational inputs characteristic of the period of modern 
economic growth - and that is very recent indeed and limited so far to a 
minority of the earth's nations - were simply not present in the past. The 
administrators of the premodern state can hardly be faulted for their"feudal 
autocratic" failings in not applying them more vigorously. 
Premodern growth was neither continuous, nor even, nor homogeneous in 
all the regions of China in the thousand years from the end of the Tang to the 
portentous confrontation in the nineteenth century with the Western powers, 
which themselves had begun the process of modern economic growth. The 
quantity and character of the actual inputs, direct and indirect, by the 
government to both the supply and demand sides of the economy were 
among the factors giving actual historical contours, according to time and 
place, to this premodern growth. At times the actions of the state certainly 
had a perceptible"lubrieating" effect on the increase of population and total 
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output in traditional China. But they could never be so decisive as the 
dynamics of the private economy itself. 
Government Influence on Agriculture and Commerce 
Direct state influence on agriculture, which accounted for perhaps 70 percent 
of the output value of the economy, was small as suggested by our estimate of 
taxes as a share of national income. And the share of government land of 
various kinds in the total cultivated area, although it varied by period and 
locality was never - even in the Yuan dynasty - very large. Even if we include 
the palace estates (huangzhuang) and aristocratic estates (zhuangtian) to- 
gether with the military colonies, state pastures, etc., government property 
was limited in the early Ming and was even less at the end of the dynasty. In 
the eighteenth century, 92 percent of registered land was private land, and 
only 8 percent, including all the land nominally allocated to the Manchu 
banners (quasi-tribal military formations), was government land. 
While there are many records of a government role in the opening of new 
land or the resettlement of territories depopulated as a result of war or civil 
war, for the most part this participation took the form of loans by local 
officials of seeds, tools, etc., to private farmers together with the remission of 
all or part of the taxes due on the newly developed land for a stated period of 
years. Rarely unless we so consider the military colonies (tuntian) of the 
early Ming and Qing - was the colonization of new agricultural land under- 
taken under direct state auspices. But note that substantial amounts of land 
brought under cultivation in the provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hunan, 
Hubei, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou during the Qing were never included 
on the tax rolls - in effect, an important state subsidy for the settlement of 
these developing areas. In a similar manner, there are many indications of the 
contributions made by individual members of the bureaucratic or local elite 
to the introduction of new crops (maize, potatoes, cotton, for example), the 
spread of improved seeds and cultivation methods, and the very critical 
extension of double-cropping. But the augmentation of these inputs into 
9 agriculture did not result primarily from any government-led effort, and does 
not even seem to have been regularly coordinated by local or central officials. 
Water conservancy projects, primarily for flood control but also for irriga- 
tion and transportation, in contrast, were matters in which government 
planning, administration, and funding were critical. In the Qing, the problem 
of the Huai river, for example, was a continuous and costly one, but some 
basic control of its flooding was essential to agricultural output. The large 
dikes and embankments where the Han river meets the Yangzi; the dikes 
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along the Xiang river near Hankou; the effort to control the flow of the 
Chang Jiang (Yangzi river) above Yichang, where it passes through a low 
plain; the major flood-control systems in the vicinity of Lake Tai; and those 
on the Min river in north Sichuan, where it flows across the Chengdu plain - 
these and similar projects were undertakings of such a scale and complexity 
that they could only have been carried out with substantial tax funds and 
some degree of centralized initiative and direction. Once completed, howev- 
er, the administration of the allocation of water and the maintenance and 
repair of the dikes, dams, embankments, sluices, gates, etc., were left largely 
to the local gentry landlords and independent farmers whose agricultural 
properties benefitted from their operation. 
And the critical importance of the Grand Canal, first for the economies of the 
Tang and Song dynasties, and then for their successors, hardly requires 
comment. It was of course primarily to facilitate the transport of tax grains 
and other goods to the northern capitals that the imperial governments 
undertook this enormous engineering project, which was beyond the capaci- 
ty of the fragmented private sector to build. For nearly a thousand years, 
however, the tonnage of private shippers - and the most private of all, 
smugglers, too - probably outnumbered the official grain tribute, salt, and 
copper vessels on this major north-south commercial artery. 
I have already mentioned the system of official granaries, which in various 
guises goes back at least to the Song. In its concern with maintaining a 
normal food supply, it reflected both the self-image and the self-interest of 
the Confucian ruler. The grain harvest was as important in the calculations 
of the French monarchs in the eighteenth century, and in the lives of the 
population for whom grain was the staple diet and principal item of expendi- 
ture, as it was to the Chinese rulers and people. But neither the elaborate state 
controls intended to prevent hoarding and speculation in times of poor 
harvests nor the alternating occasional efforts at free trade in grain as 
advocated by the Physiocrats were very successful in France. It seems that 
the basic problem for the French monarch was his inability to collect 
information about production and consumption, and to enforce his orders in 
the rural areas. If there was at least a superficial similarity between the 
obligations to popular welfare (and self preservation) that moved both the 
French king and the Chinese emperor, the Qing government, unlike the 
French, did not normally meddle with the rice trade. Apart from maintaining 
a system of granaries (scattered over the face of China with only small 
amounts in any one county, and in total amounting to no more than 3 to 4 
percent of the annual harvest), it only occasionally commutated or diverted 
the tribute rice, and even less frequently allocated public funds for the 
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purchase and shipment of grain to areas of local shortage. At least in the long 
era of domestic peace during the eighteenth century, these measures were 
generally sufficient to cope with food supply crises. Should we conclude that 
both the information - in the regular monthly reports on grain prices 
submitted by local officials - and the administrative efficiency of the Qing 
government were superior to France, or was the critical difference the 
effective operation of a large-scale private grain trade in China, which made 
most government involvement superfluous? 
The commercialization of agriculture, that is, the sale of an increasing share 
of farm output on the market, does not necessarily result in greater personal 
freedom for the peasant farmer. In early modern Western Europe, the 
growth of market demand did by the eighteenth century result in tenants 
being largely freed of personal and labor obligations to now increasingly 
absentee owners, and their being able to make their own cultivating and 
marketing decisions in light of the likely prices for their inputs and outputs. 
In Eastern and Central Europe, however, the expanding demand for grain by 
the growing seaboard cities of Western Europe led to what has been called a 
"refeudalization" of the agrarian system after 1500. The lords of eastern 
Germany, the Hapsburg dominions, the Baltic provinces of Russia, and of 
Russia itself proceeded, forcefully when necessary, to deprive peasant and 
merchant of the limited freedoms that they had earlier gained, and to 
reimpose peasant labor services on the lord's land. The increased grain 
output was sold for export by the lords themselves. Probably the major 
reasons for these different outcomes in the two regions of Europe were the 
relative shortage of labor in the east (tying the peasant to the land was an 
effort to hold down labor costs), and the greater strength of the monarchy in 
the west, which thus could better resist, as in France, noble pressures for 
refeudalization. 
Judging from the still insufficient studies that have been made, one might 
reasonably conclude that the status of the Chinese peasant - in the Qing 
period at least, and probably in most regions in much of the Ming dynasty as 
well- was closer to that of the French peasant of the eighteenth century than 
to the serf of eastern Europe. Some servile obligations remained in some 
regions (the most "backward," least "developed"), but the more degrading 
and burdensome had gone, if indeed they had ever been widespread: per- 
sonal servitude, heavy and sometimes unlimited labor services, general 
insecurity of tenure, and the obligation to give children into service in the 
landlord's household. These were features of the kind of serfdom to be found 
in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, but they were exceptional 
rather than common in late imperial China. 
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This old order in Eastern Europe was transformed into the kind of society we 
frequently describe as capitalist or bourgeois, and that became the dominant 
type in nineteenth-century Europe. The emancipation of the serfs (except of 
course for the residual serfdom in France, which the Revolution brought to 
an end) was the work of the absolute monarchies. If the intellectual inspira- 
tion and justification came from the spread of the doctrine of reason of the 
Enlightenment, the immediate causes of these changes were the great wars of 
the eighteenth century. For either aggression or defense, the absolute mo- 
narchs required enlarged armed forces and the taxes to pay for them. 
Increased state revenue, in turn, was dependent upon higher agricultural 
output, a reduction of the "feudal" privileges of the nobility that obstructed 
higher productivity, and incentives to the peasant producers for their greater 
efforts. 
I am not certain what the functional equivalent in late imperial China might 
have been for this"end of the old order in rural Europe," or what consequen- 
ces would have followed for agricultural output and economic development. 
The general European changes, for which the positive model was the "agri- 
cultural revolution" in England (enclosures and continuous crop rotation in 
place of traditional open field practices, the development of an effective 
integration between farming and herding), were hardly relevant to the inten- 
sive rice and wheat cultivation of China. What changes, if any, in peasant 
status and agricultural practice that were both known and workable in the 
China of the Qing dynasty - not those that became possible only in the 
mid-twentieth century could the Chinese state have executed? Perhaps 
none at all, maybe because the appropriate technology was unknown, the 
pressure of population on land was intense, and because the privileged 
landed elite provided the empire's key officials, whereas in Europe, the 
absolute monarchs were not beholden in the same manner to either baron or 
burgher. It is quite possible, in other words, that there was no way open for 
late imperial China to transform its economy on an indigenous basis. The 
Yongzheng emperor, however, who was never much liked by the Confucian 
gentry as his treatment by the traditional historians shows, issued decrees in 
1727 and 1728 which transformed the status of the remnant of semi-free 
agricultural workers and other hereditary inferior social groups from that of 
fianmin ("base people") to liangmin ("ordinary commoners"). Did China 
need an enlightened despot? 
Commerce in late imperial China, as already remarked, was primarily 
private commerce. The larger participants were in some manner usually 
licensed by officialdom (although this was certainly not so for the multitudi- 
nous petty traders). Yahang ("licensed brokers") were a common pheno- 
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menon. They were frequently expected to help regulate the conduct of lesser 
firms in their lines of business. Commercial taxes were general, but not very 
heavy before the lO'in ("likin") transit tax of the mid-nineteenth century. 2~ 
From the Song through the Qing, the trade in a number of different commod- 
ities was handled by state-controlled monopolies, but of these, only the salt 
monopoly was continuously important and of significant size. And 50 
percent of the salt consumed in the mid-Qing was privately-sold, smuggled 
salt in any case. After the breakdown of the Tang regulated market system, 
domestic markets and fairs (which were apparently less common than in 
Europe, where fairs might be organized by monarchs, nobles, or the church) 
were developed mainly as the result of merchant initiatives. (There are 
exceptions, of course; Zhu Yuanzhang tried mightily to attract merchants to 
his capital at Nanjing.) In foreign trade, the state more frequently took an 
active part, by designating the cities on the coast and the inland frontier 
locations where trade was permitted; by participating directly in the trade 
itself, for example, in that part of it associated with the "tribute system" of the 
Ming and Qing dynasties; 21 and by directing the duties and other revenues 
directly to the imperial court. Foreign trade might sometimes be prohibited 
or restricted for strategic or political-ideological reasons, but rarely success- 
fully. When the Mongols were denied access to the Ming tribute system, they 
obtained what they needed of Chinese goods either by armed forays across 
the border or by smuggling. The Ming formal prohibition on Chinese ships 
trading abroad, which lasted from the first quarter of the fifteenth century 
until well into the sixteenth, did little in fact to hinder a growing private 
commerce with Japan and Southeast Asia. 
In sum, it does not appear that traditional prejudices against commerce 
sometimes attributed to the Chinese state in fact hindered commercial 
development very much from the Song onward. But, do we know to what 
degree, if any, the total volume of trade grew faster than the growth of 
population and output? How much more intensely commercialized, as mea- 
sured by per capita trade, was the Ming of the Wanli era (sixteenth century), 
or the Qing in the Qianlong emperor's reign (eighteenth century) than the 
Song of Wang Anshi's time (twelfth century)? Sometimes merchants could 
become very rich indeed, by plowing back their commercial profits into the 
market, as with the well-studied merchants of Huizhou or Yangzhou. But 
was there any difference between the quality and economic significance of 
the commercial activity of the Qing and that of the Song? 
As with the expansion of the output of agriculture and handicrafts, the 
absolute growth in the scale of commerce from the tenth century to the 
eighteenth appears to have consisted mainly of more units of essentially the 
318 
same activity. This was so in spite of the range of activities of some of the 
wealthy (salt, the rice and silk trades, pawnshops, mining, and shipping, at 
least for the famous Yangzhou merchants); and in spite of the quite complex 
organization of such businesses as silk weaving, the calendering of cotton 
cloth, shipping, and the proto-banking of the Shanxi merchants. Even the 
proliferation of huiguan (Landsmannschaften) 22 in the Ming and Qing 
periods - indicative perhaps of an increased quantity of interregional com- 
merce - also suggests that the actual presence of the principals was still 
required in order to close a deal, and therefore that institutionalized means 
for impersonal regularized conduct of long-distance trade (by correspon- 
dence, for example) were underdeveloped. 
We have no long-term data on the movement of interest rates from which to 
judge the degree to which capital might have been ir~ short supply during 
these many centuries. The economy was certainly not at the subsistence level, 
and premodern capital requirements are generally not large; individual 
examples of considerable accumulations are many; and there were some 
institutions (although they were weakly developed and not protected by 
formal legal codes and rapid access to judicial procedures) for pooling capital 
on a larger scale, e.g., partnerships, lineage common properties (yizhuang 
and the like), or joint ventures in the maritime trade with Southeast Asia. To 
a considerable degree, however, this capital was immobilized, tied up in 
things as they were, or even misused, misinvested, and dissipated. Analytical- 
ly, the familiar purchase (voluntarily or not) of degrees, titles, and offices by 
wealthy merchants represented the conversion of commercial capital into 
government revenues to be used for day-to-day expenses. And the transfer of 
capital to landlords (by the purchase of rural properties; and also in marriage 
contracts?), while it redistributed income and drove up land prices, had no 
necessarily positive effect on agricultural production. 
In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, in contrast, the state directly 
and indirectly played a part in expanding investment opportunities and 
reducing the risk with the consequence that capital previously tied up in 
traditional investments as in China - was induced to participate in new 
ventures. To be sure, only in the nineteenth century was the European capital 
market capable of regularly channeling investments into industrial enter- 
prises, but an important first step was to reduce the enormous over- 
investment in land. Directly, the development of genuine funded national 
debts in the place of ad hoc loans made government bonds and annuities an 
alternative to land as a safe investment. Indirectly, government bonds were 
linked by the new modern public banks (the Bank of England was estab- 
lished in 1694) with the critically important process of creating "credit 
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money." The spread of negotiable bills of exchange from the seventeenth 
century particularly facilitated the augmentation of the money supply 
through credit creation by the banks. The growth of a mortgage market was 
dependent on legislative and legal developments with respect to land titles 
and protection for the borrower so long as interest was paid. Similarly, the 
permanence of joint stock companies and the negotiability of their shares 
could only develop in a context of enabling commercial legislation and 
accumulated business case law. Neither Marxist-Leninist five-year plans nor 
Keynesian intervention to be sure, but the true history of the beginnings of 
modern economic growth in Western Europe is surely obscured if we do not 
give due weight to the political context and to the government-led institu- 
tional innovations that provided the "social space" and "social overhead 
capital" so critical for the transformation of the private agricultural and 
industrial sectors. 
In late imperial China, we may schematically identify a section of the 
merchants who, like their counterparts in relatively stagnant places in early 
modern Europe, continued to invest their profits in honorific titles and land. 
In the leading commercial cities, there was a second group who, although 
more wealthy (like the leading salt merchants or the Shanxi bankers), aspired 
resolutely to obtain gentry status for themselves and perhaps even high office 
for their sons. There appear to have been few of a third category - the 
equivalent of the commission merchants, putting-out merchants, colonial 
traders, and industrial entrepreneurs of Western Europe who exploited the 
new investment opportunities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
with the aid of the increasingly efficient network of commercial institutions 
fostered in part by the state that was coming into being. 1 do not believe that 
the main difference in the relations between state and merchant in China and 
Europe is located in the often-cited exaction, by the Qing, for example, of 
millions of taels of"contributions" (baoxiao, etc.) from the salt merchants 
and the Guangzhou Cohong. 23 Early modern European rulers also bor- 
rowed heavily from Italian and south German bankers to finance the estab- 
lishment of the emerging absolute monarchies, to underwrite their wars and 
colonial ventures. Defaults and the refunding of these loans on terms unfa- 
vorable to the lender were frequent occurrences. But even if we take account 
of such practices in both China and Europe, the premodern state, as I have 
already suggested, was not in fact able to transfer directly any very large 
share of the national income from the private sector to the public. 
Partly, there were not the same new investment opportunities in late imperial 
China - for example, on the scale of the cost-reducing potential of rural 
industry in England whose "new draperies" made it possible for the British 
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woolens to dominate international markets; or those called forth by enlarged 
domestic demand arising from an agricultural revolution, which significantly 
increased the output per capita of agricultural workers; or, of course, those 
connected with the colonial trade. And, most important for the subject of 
this essay, the Chinese state had contributed little to the elaboration of the 
legal, financial, and commercial institutions that could facilitate the shift of 
commercial capital (i.e., circulating capital that was relatively easily with- 
drawn from poor investments) into industrial investment (i.e., fixed capital, 
"sunk" into plant, machinery, transportation) - while still protecting inves- 
tors' liquidity through security markets and the like. 
Premodern economic growth (as I have defined it above) is essentially a 
phenomenon of agricultural and commercial capital. In preindustrial Eng- 
land, it required eight times as much capital investment to employ a worker 
in agriculture as it did in (handicraft) industry. Modern economic growth, 
however, is the joint product of investment in fixed capital and in science and 
technology. It is not likely to develop out of the production of luxury 
handicrafts such as silk or porcelain. That Chinese government supervision 
or control of the Jingdezhen pottery industry, 24 for example, apparently was 
a considerable burden on the private pottery firms is, it seems to me, of less 
consequence than the failure of the state - in spite of a long history of 
sophisticated monetary theory - to institutionalize the monetary basis for 
economic expansion. 
A tremendous effort was expended by the Qing government to insure an 
adequate supply of copper for coinage by the imperial mints. The copper 
trade with Japan was encouraged and controlled; private investors were 
induced by advances of official funds to develop mines in Yunnan (in 
southwest China); the shipment of four thousand tons a year of refined 
copper some three thousand miles by boat, northward via the Yangzi river 
and Grand Canal, was a major undertaking, etc. But in fact, the supply of 
copper money was outside the effective control of the government (because of 
both counterfeiting and illegal melting of the coins, depending on the current 
market value of copper). And the government similarly lacked control over 
the supply of monetary silver(due to low domestic production, lack of control 
over bullion imports and exports, hoarding, etc.). Inflexibility of supply, lack 
of standardization, fluctuating silver/copper exchange rates - all of these 
increased the risks and uncertainty of business transactions. In fact, the 
notable expansion of commercial transactions accompanying the large eco- 
nomic growth of the eighteenth century was made possible in part by the 
issuance of a variety of paper notes and credit instruments, not by the state 
but by the private sector. None of this private paper money was fully 
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institutionalized. To a large extent, the size and velocity of its circulation 
depended on private or personal factors; it had, of course, no legal standing 
nor the backing of a state-regulated central bank. How much credit money in 
fact was created is unknown; perhaps not really enough? Its supply could 
shrink as rapidly as it grew, if the implied silver (and copper) reserves would 
themselves diminish, as in fact they did in the second quarter of the nine- 
teenth century as silver flowed out of China in payment for opium. 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
Non-development of a modern economy, the failure to begin modern eco- 
nomic growth, I am prepared to argue but that would require another article 
- is"over-determined." It's not a particularly interesting theoretical question 
any more. Proponents of economic, political, cultural, social structural, 
demographic and other explanations have each adduced overwhelming ar- 
guments and evidence for their favored explanations. In fact, any one or 
two - is a sufficiently mortal debility for the premodern economies and 
societies that they have studied. More is merely overkill. What we really don't 
know for sure yet is how modern economic growth begins - even in the case 
of Western Europe whose economic history has been minutely examined for 
more than a century. The common fate of most of mankind before the very 
recent past - slow and uncertain premodern growth of population and 
output where it occurred, stagnation or decline otherwise - has not (by 
historians at least) received attention comparable to the more fashionable 
problem of modern development, whether that be phrased as the Marxist 
"transition" from "feudalism" to "capitalism," the neo-classical growth mod- 
el, or the perhaps now somewhat faded study of "modernization." 
Late imperial China from the tenth century to the nineteenth experienced 
in world perspective a remarkable millennium of premodern economic 
growth (see table 1). Population and total grain output each increased by a 
factor of five or six over these centuries, in contrast to the first millennium of 
the imperial era - from the Qin (221-206 B.C.) through the Tang (618-906) - 
during which, with often sharp fluctuations, a sort of plateau seems have 
been reached early and never overcome. (Europe's population growth was 
comparable - the estimates of course, like those for China, are sometimes 
more testimony to our faith than to our science. There were perhaps 39 
million inhabitants in about 1000, 74 million before the demographically 
disastrous fourteenth century, a recovery to 50 million by 1450, 105 million in 
about 1600, 115 million about 1700, and a total of possibly 190 million 
inhabitants in 1800.) While overall impressive, the growth of people and 
production in late imperial China was uneven in both rate and locale, and 
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punctuated by severe fluctuations due to both natural and manmade disas- 
ters. 
Neither the direct nor the indirect influences of the state on the economy were 
major factors determining the nature and rate of this premodern economic 
growth. That was largely decided by the dynamics of the dominant private 
sector of the economy. So far as they affected premodern growth the policies 
and actions of China's imperial government do not seem to have differed 
greatly in range or quality from those of the emerging national states of early 
modern Europe before, let us say, the seventeenth century. Certainly the 
acceleration of traditional growth in seventeenth- and especially eighteenth- 
century China argues against the view that the late imperial "feudal auto- 
cracy" was a major obstacle to economic performance in the Ming and Qing 
periods. On balance, the actions of the state probably helped rather than 
hindered the long-term growth of population and total output. The state's 
control of or influence over only a very low percentage of gross national 
product at the very least limited negative interference with the private sector 
where the most remarkable Ming-Qing achievements originated. 
Toward modern economic growth, on the other hand, the Chinese state 
contributed little if anything, in contrast to the history of early modern 
Europe. I have already suggested that this conclusion should not be surpris- 
ing. It, rather than the still only partially understood European experience, 
represents the mode in world history. The fact that state policies and perfor- 
mance might have "lubricated" late imperial economic expansion does not 
imply any necessary forward linkages to the much different and much more 
difficult task of expanding not just total output but output per capita. The 
experience of the past is surely not irrelevant, but it may not all be positive for 
the goal of achieving economic growth in the modern epoch. Thus the 
Chinese experience of managing and participating in complex bureaucratic 
organizations may have left a positive legacy for the twentieth century. 25 And 
similarly, the much higher degree of male literacy in Qing China than we 
have hitherto assumed, demonstrated in the admirable work of Evelyn S. 
Rawski, would presumably be conducive to the later achievement of modern 
economic growth. 26 But the distancing- whether by cultural choice or due to 
political weakness of the state from the private economy, while it may have 
facilitated premodern growth, could be a negative rather than a positive asset 
for a"backward" country seeking economic growth in the twentieth century, 
as Professor Gerschenkron has shown us. 27 
Does the contrast between late imperial China and early modern Europe 
derive, after all, mainly from the greater relative "success" of the Chinese 
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experience under conditions of premodern economic growth? I refer of 
course to the achievement of a unified and integrated polity with an adequate 
customary standard of living for most of the population (in "normal" times), 
which was spared (or deprived of?.) disquieting church-state conflicts and 
international wars (for the most part), where one found no "Sunday Confu- 
cians" and no domestic"modernist" challenge to a deeply rooted and genuine 
conservatism before the twentieth century. There was little reason for the 
Qing emperors and the bureaucratic elite who served them, while they still 
had the power to do so before the shameful nineteenth century, to follow the 
path of the Houses of Stuart, Bourbon, and Hapsburg and their bureaucratic 
administrators who built the modern European nation-states and purveyed 
some of the critical abstractions and institutions of law and property that 
unwittingly perhaps facilitated Europe's modern economic growth. The 
Chinese rulers already possessed "all under heaven" (tianxia), and they could 
hardly foresee how parochial that universal conceit would become. 
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I. My use of"late imperial China" - i.e., the Song (960-1279), Yuan [or Mongol] (1279-1368), 
Ming (1368 1644), and Qing [or Manchu] (1644 1911) dynasties -~ in contrast to the first 
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epoch from the former. Among other things, post-Tang dynasty (618 906) China was 
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1644- 1911 ," Yale University, Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper no. 299, October 
1978, 18. 
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8. The Shanxi banks, engaged primarily in inter-provincial fund transfers, had originated in 
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9. The qianzhuang typically accepted deposits at interest, remitted funds, and financed moder- 
ate-sized local commercial transactions. 
10. Weisuo, hereditary guard units established at strategic spots on the Inner Asian frontier and 
the seacoast, at the capital and along the Grand Canal. 
I I. Most of the "Japanese pirates" were in fact Chinese raiders from the coastal areas. 
12. The civil service examination system, elaborated in the Song dynasty and later, provided 
most of the imperial bureaucrats. The highest degree, jinshi, was awarded at triennial 
examinations in the capital to no more than 200-300 successful candidates on each occasion. 
Juren was a provincial degree also awarded triennially. Lower degree holder (jiansheng, etc.) 
were not normally eligible for official appointments. 
13. Albert Feuerwerker, State and SocieO' in Eighteenth-Century China: The Ch'ing Empire in 
its GIoo', Michigan Monographs in Chinese Studies 27 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese 
Studies, 1976), I I 24. 
14. Wang Anshi's reform program may perhaps be seen as furthering central government 
interests at the expense of the local gentry, and hence was attacked as "Legalist," i.e., 
non-Confucian because it relied too heavily on laws and institutions rather than internalized 
Confucian morality. 
15. Brian E. McKnight, "Song Legal Privileges," unpublished paper prepared for a Sino-Amer- 
ican Symposium on Chinese Social and Economic History from the Song to 1900. Beijing, 
26 October 1 November 1980. 
16. This is not the place to attempt to elucidate this complex subject, but the conflicting 
interpretations of the economy and society of the Song period offered by the historical 
schools of Kyoto and Tokyo universities have enormously influenced scholars elsewhere. 
17. Fangtianjunshuifa, new land surveys intended to eliminate old inequities and provide a 
basis for taxation based on the relative productive capacity of the soil. 
18. The"single whip" reform, whichoccurredgraduallyovertheyears 1522 1619, combined the 
various and numerous items of taxation under one or a small number of headings, and 
collected these taxes in silver. Moreover, much of the burden of corv~e was in the process 
combined with the land tax. 
19. Yangwupai, the late nineteenth-century advocates of"self-strengthening" who borrowed 
military and industrial technology from the West for their pioneer enterprises. While most of 
the self-strengtheners did not venture so far as to advocate political changes, the "reformers 
of 1898" envisaged the transformation of the empire into a constitutional monarchy on the 
model of Japan and Germany. 
20. The lijin transit tax was first levied in 1853 in order to finance gentry-led militia units who 
fought against the Taiping rebels. It eventually became a major source of both provincial 
and central revenue and a considerable burden on domestic trade. 
21. "Legal" foreign trade in much of the Ming and Qing periods was restricted to goods 
exchanged at the frontiers or in the capital in connection with "tribute missions" dispatched 
to China by her smaller continental neighbors and by the island states of the South Pacific 
ocean. In theory, the Chinese emperor was more concerned with this recognition of his 
superior status than with the potential profits of international trade. Practice early on had 
ruptured the tribute framework as Asian commerce expanded notably from the fifteenth 
century onward. But the theory and the ritual that embellished it were retained. 
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22. The huiguan, organized in alien cities by merchants from a particular area, are sometimes 
referred to as gilds and indeed had that exclusive characteristic insofar as they operated to 
enhance and protect the interests of non-local merchants residing in cities outside of their 
home districts. 
23. "Guangzhou Cohong," the licensed merchants at Canton (Guangzhou) who conducted the 
legal foreign trade with the Europeans at that port in the decades before the Opium War. 
24. Jingdezhen in Jiangxi province for centuries was a leading pottery center. Both government 
and private kilns operated there, the private firms often as sub-contractors to the official 
kilns. 
25. See Albert Feuerwerker, "Characteristics of the Chinese Economic Model Specific to the 
Chinese Environment," in Robert F. Dernberger, ed., China's Development Experience in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 261 305. 
26. Evelyn S. Rawski, Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1979). 
27. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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